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The Unification of Law  
in the Russian Federation
Jeffrey Kahn, Alexei Trochev, and Nikolay Balayan1
Abstract: How have fluctuating approaches to federalism in post-Soviet Russia  
 affected its legal system? This article examines the core legal subjects, processes, 
and institutions composing the Russian legal system. The source of legal changes, as 
 Russian federalism has shifted from decentralized beginnings under Yel’tsin to the 
current centralized system under Medvedev and Putin, is evaluated. Seeds for cen-
tralization in the original 1993 Constitution and the roles of “top down,” “bottom up,” 
and “outside in” pressures to centralize the federal system are examined. The degree 
of unification and centralization of Russian law and the de facto nature of the legal 
system are analyzed.
It is undeniably true that in the last nine years Russian law has experi-enced an extraordinary period of unification. In other words, harmony 
has increasingly replaced conflict between federal and regional legal acts. 
Whether the Russian Federation (Russia) continues to operate a federal 
system of government, however, is a question on which reasonable minds 
differ. On the one hand, the Constitution proclaims Russia to be a  “federal, 
rule-of-law” state, divides the country into 83 component states of six dif-
ferent types, and appears to allocate separate spheres of both exclusive 
and shared jurisdiction both to the central government and to the com-
ponent states. On the other hand, Russia’s political system has grown 
 increasingly centralized and the actual implementation of the Constitu-
tion’s division of jurisdiction between governments has resulted in such 
1Jeffrey Kahn, Assistant Professor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University; 
Alexei Trochev, Jerome Hall Fellow, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington; 
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an extraordinary degree of central control that the de facto federal nature 
of the system is thrown into doubt. 
The Russian Federation emerged from the rubble of its predeces-
sor, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, itself the largest 
 component state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soviet federal-
ism, however, was a façade that did not mask a rigidly centralized system 
operating under the explicit control of the Communist Party (Kahn, 2002). 
Russia is not the Soviet Union. But the course of Russian federalism has 
been influenced by this past. It has become progressively more centralized 
in its first 18, post-Soviet years. This change has played an important role 
in the unification of law.
The first decade of Russian federalism was characterized by an eco-
nomically and politically weak central government that struggled to main-
tain control over newly empowered, ethnically non-Russian, resource-rich 
component states. The Federation Treaty (signed March 1992) devolved 
considerable power to these components in an effort to preserve the state 
itself. The Russian Constitution (adopted December 1993, displacing the 
Federation Treaty) created a strong federal executive and the potential 
for a dominant central government. Nevertheless, political and economic 
considerations led the first Russian President, Boris Yel’tsin (1991–1999), 
to negotiate scores of treaties and agreements with the executive leader-
ship of many of the component states. These documents ceded substantial 
federal authority ranging from control over taxation and natural resources 
to the setting of cultural and linguistic policies. They were both a cause 
and effect of an extraordinary disharmony between the laws of the cen-
tral government and those of the defiant component states. The mid-
1990s were characterized by a so-called War of Laws, in which the central 
government asserted that thousands of component state-level laws and 
executive orders contravened the Constitution. Many component states 
routinely withheld taxes, refused conscripts, or otherwise defied the legal 
mandates asserted by the central government.
Russia’s second president, Vladimir Putin (2000–2008), ended this 
shadowy bilateral treaty system and took as his first task the strength-
ening of federal executive power. The central government reasserted the 
supremacy of the Constitution, accomplished a considerable unification 
of law, and blurred a previously clearer division of central and regional 
power (and the political constituencies for that power) into a so-called 
“unified system of executive power” (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 77(2)). 
Most areas of law have been unified under a broad and strict rule of fed-
eral legal supremacy enforced by a centrally administered judiciary and 
by a variety of centrally controlled bureaucracies. Russia’s third president, 
Dmitriy Medvedev, has given no indication in the first year of his presi-
dency that he will deviate from this approach.
This article critically evaluates the institutions, laws, procedures, 
and forces that have resulted in so centralized a system of law. We begin 
with a broad introduction to the pressures that led Russia to adopt 





























312  KAHN ET AL.
 formula that distributes jurisdiction over legal subjects and spaces. Then 
we evaluate how Russia’s formal institutions—legislatures, executives, 
and courts—have built (or weakened) the separation of powers between 
the federal center and the component states of the Russian Federation. 
Finally, we present three different dynamics to the unification of laws and 
its concomitant effect on the centralization of federal power. We charac-
terize these forces as coming from the “top down” (imposed by Moscow 
on the regions), from the “bottom up” (informal regional forces lobbying 
for  uniformity), and from the “outside in” (international legal institutions 
and norms of law to which Russia has obligated itself). In our judgment, 
the first dynamic has been the dominant one. 
Russian federalism has swung dramatically toward the centraliza-
tion side of the continuum in a very short period of time. The speed and 
extremity of that shift suggest the malleability of Russia’s federal rules of 
the game, a game that is by no means over.
THE CASE FOR FEDERALISM
Six of the world’s seven largest states are both federal and democratic 
(Kahn, 2002).2 It should not be entirely surprising, therefore, that federal-
ism was an appealing organizing philosophy for the new  Russian state 
that, at the start of the 1990s, professed to be a democratic republic and 
found itself shrouded in the musty infrastructure of Soviet federal bound-
aries and institutions. Along with its enormous size, substantial ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and other social cleavages in the  Russian Federation 
are coupled with sharply asymmetrical allocations of natural resources 
and economic potential. This section provides a brief introduction to these 
various factors, natural catalysts for federal organization in a state that 
had denounced the autocratic alternative that had heretofore marked 
 Russian imperial history. 
More than four-fifths of the population is ethnically Russian. A 
combination of Imperial Russian and Soviet history, however, estab-
lished substantial populations of non-Russian ethnic groups in 
 different parts of the Federation: Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples in 
the Volga Region (Tatars, Bashkirs, Mariis, Udmurts, Chuvash, and 
Mordvins), the North (Komi, Karelians), and Eastern Siberia (Tuvins, 
Buryats, Yakuts). The North Caucasus is home to scores of Slavic 
and non-Slavic ethnic groups, including Chechens, Kalmyks, Avars, 
 Ossetians, Ingush, and many others. Although Russian is the official 
language, all of these different ethnic groups speak different languages 
with varying degrees of linguistic overlap and mutual intelligibility. Most 
religious Russians are Orthodox Christians. Most of the Turkic peoples 
2In order of geographic size, those states are Russia, Canada, the United States, Brazil, 
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of the Volga Region and many of the ethnic groups of the North Cauca-
sus are Muslims. Kalmyks and Tuvins are Buddhists. There are also sub-
stantial populations of adherents to other forms of Christian Orthodoxy 
(e.g., the Georgian Orthodox Church) and Christianity (e.g., the Armenian 
 Apostolic Church, Protestantism, and Catholicism). Although adherents 
have dwindled in numbers, Judaism has a long history in Russia (as does 
anti-Semitism).
For these multi-cultural reasons, the Russian constitution makes an 
important distinction that is often lost in translation. The first article of 
the Russian Federation Constitution identifies the state by two names of 
equal validity: Russia (Rossiya) and the Russian Federation  (Rossiyskaya 
Federatsiya). A citizen of Russia is not a Russian (russkiy)—that adjec-
tive describes one of several Slavic ethnic groups—but a Rossiyanin 
(rossiyskiy)—a civic category that may include any of the over 100 ethnic 
groups that populate the country. 
One need look no further than the two wars fought in Chechnya to 
imagine the violence into which Russian ethno-federal politics are capable 
of descending. These sources of ethnic conflict extend back centuries, but 
were subject to particular manipulation by early Bolshevik planners, who 
deliberately created “titular” ethnic republics (i.e., political units named 
for particular ethnic groups, whose indigenous languages and customs 
were also given privileged status) to secure support for their seizure of 
power (Kahn, 2002). Subsequent demographic trends resulted in minority 
status for several ethnic groups within their “own” republics or regions. 
According to the 1989 census, the titular ethnic groups in 15 of 20  ethnic 
republics within the boundaries of the RSFSR were a minority of the pop-
ulation (Kahn, 2000). These ethnically based divisions took on a life of 
their own after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Forty-six provinces and 
two federal cities now have predominantly ethnic Russian populations, 
whereas the other component states are mostly named for non-Russian 
ethnic groups that in most cases constituted at least a plurality of their 
population (Kahn, 2002). According to the most recent census, conducted 
in 2002, Russians predominate in more regions named for non-Russian 
ethnic groups, but are outnumbered in a few more titular republics.3
3According to statistics provided in Table 4.2 (“National composition for regions of the 
Russian Federation”) of the 2002 Russian census report, non-Russian ethnic groups 
outnumber Russians in the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Kalmykiya, Karachayevo-
Cherkessiya, North Ossetiya–Alaniya, Tatarstan, Tuva, Chuvashiya, and Yakutiya, and in 
the Agin-Buryat and Komi-Permiyatskiy Autonomous Districts (Goskomstat Rossii, 2004, 
Table 4.2). Subsequent to the census, however, the Komi-Permiyatskiy Autonomous District 
merged with Perm’ Oblast’ (Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ of March 25, 2004) and 
the Agin-Buryat Autonomous District merged with Chita Oblast’ to form Zabaykal’skiy Kray 
(Federal Constitutional Law No. 5-FKZ of July 21, 2007). These mergers resulted in a majority 





























314  KAHN ET AL.
As of this writing, Russia  comprises 83 component states.4 There are 
46 provinces, 21 republics, nine territories, four autonomous districts, one 
autonomous province, and two “cities of federal significance,”  Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 65(1)).5 Some component 
states form part of the territory of other component states, and thus have 
special relationships with those components. The Constitution requires 
that all component states “shall have equal rights as constituent entities of 
the Russian Federation” and “be equal with one another in relations with 
federal State government bodies” (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 5(1) and 
Art. 5(4)). This has not been interpreted to require identical structures of 
government in component states; indeed, the Constitution acknowledges 
a distinction in the organic law of republics (which have constitutions 
and are governed by presidents) compared to other components (which 
have charters and are governed by governors or mayors) (Constitution 
RF, 1994, Art. 5(2)). Only republics (which are all named for non-Russian 
ethnic groups) are constitutionally entitled to establish their own official 
languages alongside Russian (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 68(2)).
There is substantial asymmetry in natural resource allocation, devel-
opment, wealth, and education that is more often exacerbated than ame-
liorated by the structure of the federal system. Russia is richly endowed 
with natural resources unevenly distributed among its component states. 
Considerable iron ore reserves are to be found in the European part of 
Russia, which is predominantly populated with ethnic Russians living 
in provinces (oblasti). Timber stocks are largely found in remote parts of 
Siberia and in Northwest Russia (particularly the republics of Kareliya 
and Komi). Coal, oil, and natural gas deposits are also predominantly 
found in Siberia and the Far East, which are sparsely populated with 
both ethnic Russian and various indigenous peoples. The Republic of 
Sakha-Yakutiya in the Far East sits atop almost all of Russia’s substantial 
diamond reserves. In terms of development and financial wealth, there 
exist extreme disparities between the wealthiest component states (the 
federal cities of  Moscow and St. Petersburg, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Sakha-Yakutiya) and the poorest (Chechnya, Kalmykiya, and the border 
republics of the North Caucasus, Mariy El in the Volga Region, and the 
provinces of Ivanovo and Pskov).
Control over these resources was a leading cause of the struggle 
between the central government and the component states between 1990 
and 1999. In their declarations of sovereignty, the component states almost 
4The Russian Federation initially comprised 89 components. This change is the result of 
deliberate efforts to decrease the number of components by merging several in accordance 
with Article 66(5) of the Constitution.
5See also Ukazy Prezidenta RF No. 20 of January 9, 1996; No. 173 of February 10, 1996; No. 
679 of June 9, 2001; No. 841 of July 25, 2003; and Federal Constitutional Laws No. 1-FKZ of 
March 25, 2004; No. 6-FKZ of October 14, 2005; No. 2-FKZ of July 12, 2006; No. 6-FKZ of 
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universally asserted exclusive possession of everything of value in their 
territories. These declarations set the tone for newly drafted laws and 
constitutions, which also asserted complete control over natural resources 
and other valued property on the territory of the component state. These 
documents and this wealth were then used as bargaining chips to wrest 
concessions from the federal executive in the form of bilateral treaties and 
agreements.
In short, component states blessed with various forms of wealth 
sought to protect assets perceived to be “theirs,” while component states 
lacking such resources grew increasingly dependent on the largesse of the 
central government and increasingly resentful of the perceived selfishness 
of their wealthier neighbors. Much of this competition was crushed by 
Vladimir Putin. With the exception of republics that were both exception-
ally wealthy and possessed sizeable non-Russian ethnic minorities, most 
component states were stripped of their claimed powers to tax and control 
“their” resources and forced to submit to federal policies.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL FORMULA
Federal governance is a broad church, but scholars generally agree that 
federalism requires an explicit formula (typically originating in a written 
constitution but often supplemented elsewhere) to divide subject-matter 
jurisdiction between levels of government and to resolve jurisdictional 
disputes between levels of government (Kahn, 2002). Russia’s formula is 
sufficiently vague to have permitted a broad distribution of powers in the 
first seven years of its existence under its 1993 Constitution that has been 
almost completely reversed in its second decade.
Which areas of law are subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the 
central authority? Article 71 of the Constitution lists 18 subjects over 
which jurisdiction is allocated to the central government. Article 72 lists 
14  subjects over which jurisdiction is allocated to the joint authority of the 
central government and component states. All of these subject areas are, 
for all practical purposes, under the control of the central government to 
the degree that the central government desires to exercise such control. 
Article 76(2) of the Constitution provides that all laws and normative legal 
acts of the component states in areas of joint jurisdiction must be issued 
in accordance with the federal law on the issue. The Constitutional Court 
has upheld the central government’s view that in areas of joint authority 
(Article 72), the central government takes the leading role in establishing 
the space left for local law-making, even when that space is a null set. 
The central government has also been accorded a remarkable power of 
 preemption by the Constitutional Court.
Federal law often operates throughout Russia directly, unmediated by 
the law of component states. Thus, the laws of contracts, torts, property, 





























316  KAHN ET AL.
(subjects that other federal systems may leave to the jurisdiction of the 
component states) all are governed by federal law (largely to be found in 
the federal civil code). Alternatively, federal law may establish principles 
and standards that are then implemented by the law of component states. 
For example, the tax code establishes federal taxes but also establishes tax 
principles to be followed by component states and municipalities.
Thus, most law in Russia is federal law. Through a system of codifica-
tion, the central government regulates all civil law, civil procedure, crimi-
nal law, criminal procedure, administrative law and procedure, and the 
procedure for use in the commercial courts. There are federal codes gov-
erning the use of land, air, water, and forests. Federal codes also govern all 
labor law and family law. There are codes for the siting and construction 
of towns, housing, collection of taxes and customs duties, and regulation 
of government budgets. Many other areas of law are also constitutionally 
allocated to the central government. These include the establishment of 
the basic legal principles of the marketplace, fiscal and monetary policies, 
and the establishment of federal banks (including a Central Bank). The 
judicial system in Russia is almost entirely federal. The same is true of law 
enforcement personnel.
What, then, remains within the legislative jurisdiction of the compo-
nent states of the Russian Federation? As already noted, the Constitution 
identifies 14 areas over which component states and the central govern-
ment share joint authority. But this guarantees neither equal voice in the 
legislative process nor a capacious role in the regulation of these subjects. 
The central government is invariably the senior partner. Some areas of the 
law remain influenced by regionally specific legislation; among these are 
family law, tax law, real property law, and labor law. All local legislation 
in these areas must conform to federal codes establishing both general 
principles and specific requirements in these subject areas.6
Even the form of government within the component state is not the 
exclusive prerogative of component states. Article 77 of the Constitution 
indicates that the organization of legislative and executive branches of 
component state government must conform to both the “fundamentals of 
the constitutional system of the Russian Federation” and “general princi-
ples … as envisioned by a federal law.” In 2004, such a law ended elections 
for component-state executives (Federal Law No. 159-FZ of December 11, 
6Perhaps because of the Soviet legacy, the existence and independence of municipal 
government is constitutionally protected, presumably against encroachment by component 
states (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 12). Municipal property is constitutionally entitled to the 
same protection as private and state property (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 8(2)). Municipalities 
are constitutionally authorized to “independently manage municipal property, form, 
approve, and execute the local budget, establish local taxes and levies, maintain public order 
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2004). The federal president now nominates candidates to be ratified by 
the component-state legislature.7
Where are so-called residual powers allocated? Article 73 of the 
 Constitution states that “[o]utside the limits of authority of the Russian 
Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues under the 
joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation, the constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall 
enjoy full State power.” Article 76(4) directs that component states “shall 
effect their own legal regulation, including the adoption of laws and other 
normative legal acts,” in the sphere of residual powers not otherwise allo-
cated exclusively to the central government or jointly with the compo-
nent states. Exclusive and joint federal authority is so expansive that it is 
 difficult to identify subjects left to the “full State power” of component 
states. Federal constitutional or statutory silence regarding a particular 
subject, for example, is no indication that it falls under the umbrella of 
Article 73. Thus, the Constitutional Court (Konstitutsionnyy Sud Rossi-
yskoy Federatsii, hereafter KSRF) declared that component states could 
not regulate advertising because only the federal legislature could estab-
lish the foundations of a single market; advertisements were seen to be a 
part of the free distribution of goods and fair competition protected under 
that rubric by Article 8 of the Constitution (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 4-P 
of March 4, 1997).
How are conflicts over jurisdiction resolved between governments? 
Regarding subjects in Articles 71 (exclusive federal authority) and 72 (joint 
authority), the Constitution unambiguously provides for the supremacy 
of federal law in the event of conflict with component-state laws or other 
normative legal acts (Art. 76(5)). The phrase “laws or other normative 
legal acts” includes component state constitutions or charters, treaties or 
agreements negotiated with the central government, and regular legisla-
tion. The Constitutional Court has permitted the passage of federal laws 
that have the practical effect of shifting jurisdiction from the joint author-
ity envisioned by Article 72 to the exclusive jurisdiction of the central 
 government (Postanovleniye No. 1-P of January 9, 1998).
Regarding residual powers left by Articles 73 and 76(4) to compo-
nent states, the constitutional principle is precisely the opposite of the 
one stated above: “[i]n the event of a conflict between a federal law and 
a normative legal act of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation …, 
the normative legal act of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation 
shall prevail” (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 76(6)). As noted above, however, 
it is not easy to identify substantial residual powers.
7Article 1(2)(c) of this law provides that the president may dismiss the legislature and call 
early elections if it rejects his candidate three times. Dryden recognized this power in more 
literary terms over 300 years ago: “Secure his person to secure your cause/They, who possess 
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A sharp existential debate raged in the 1990s about whether the coun-
try was a “constitutional-treaty” federation (i.e., based on a federal con-
stitution, the preferred position of the central government) or a “treaty-
 constitutional” federation (i.e., a treaty-based confederation, the opinion 
of several ethnic republics). As a result, numerous assertions of “sover-
eignty” in the preamble and first few articles of the Constitution acquired 
special importance. These clauses, along with those allocating to the cen-
tral  government exclusive authority over the territory and structure of the 
country, have been read by the Constitutional Court (a strong proponent 
of the constitutional-treaty approach) as independent grounds to strike 
down legal acts by component states as unconstitutional in addition to 
more specific, sufficient grounds (see, e.g., Postanovleniye No. 10-P of 
June 7, 2000, at § 3.1).
INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND THE  
UNIFICATION OF LAW: EXECUTIVES
On the one hand, the recent history of the Russian Federation under 
its present Constitution indicates that truly recalcitrant component state 
governments simply can refuse (and have refused) to take direction from 
the central government. The results of this obstinacy on some occasions 
have been extreme and violent (Chechnya), on some occasions strate-
gic and partially successful (Tatarstan), but for the most part ultimately 
unsuccessful as a practical political matter. On the other hand, the central 
government now has the statutory power to use an array of inducements 
and threats to obtain component state compliance.8
Among his first acts as president, Vladimir Putin succeeded in  passing 
legislation to amend a 1999 federal law that had attempted to standard-
ize baseline principles for the structure of the legislative and executive 
branches of the component states (e.g., terms of office, immunity of office-
holders, etc.) (Federal Law No. 184-FZ of October 6, 1999). The amend-
ments gave the federal president the power to dismiss regional legislatures 
and executives for continuing or gross violations of federal law. Thus, the 
central government does possess the power to force the component states 
to rescind regional legislation that contravenes federal constitutional or 
statutory law. This power has been upheld by the federal judiciary (Post-
anovleniye KSRF 8-P of April 4, 2002). The dismissal process is cumber-
some and lengthy, and requires the involvement of the federal judiciary to 
determine the existence of a violation sufficient to trigger the successive 
stages to dismissal (Federal Law No. 106-FZ of July 29, 2000). This power 
8This power is obviously most effective when the federal executive—composed of a 
presidential administration as well as a government headed by a Prime Minister and a Cabinet 
of Ministers—exercises it in a non-contradictory fashion. To varying degrees, all three Russian 
presidents have been confronted with a certain rivalry within the Executive Branch. This has 
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was augmented (and rendered less likely to be used) by further legislation 
replacing direct election of governors and presidents by constituencies in 
their component states with the power of the federal president to nomi-
nate them for office (Federal Law No. 159-FZ of December 11, 2004, Art. 
1(4)(a)). The constitutionality of this statute was also upheld by the Con-
stitutional Court (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 13-P of December 21, 2005). 
Further tinkering occurred during spring 2009 to allow the majority party 
in the regional legislature to participate in the nomination process by pro-
posing a slate of candidates to the President (Federal Law No. 41-FZ of 
April 5, 2009 and Ukaz Prezidenta RF No. 441 of April 23, 2009). Some 
minor additional reforms to this process were under discussion as this 
article was being finalized, but these seem unlikely to result in substan-
tial changes (E. Bilevskaya in Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 10, 2009). At 
the most recent meeting of the Valday Discussion Club, in mid-September 
2009, President Medvedev said that he saw no reason to return to direct 
gubernatorial elections, “not now, not in one hundred years,” because “in 
my view, it does not fully correspond with Russian traditions or the level 
of federalism existing here” (K. Latukhina and S. Kuksin in Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, September 16, 2009).
The execution of central government law depends upon the areas 
involved. In some areas, the central government itself executes the law. For 
example, all law enforcement personnel are part of the federal bureaucracy 
(albeit not of the federal civil service). The investigation and prosecution of 
crime, therefore, is entirely a function executed by the central government. 
Likewise, with the exception of Justices of the Peace and judges of the cur-
rently operating constitutional or charter courts of the component states, the 
judiciary is entirely a federal one.
In some cases, the executive branch of the component state may be 
conscripted (or entitled, depending upon one’s point of view) to execute 
central government law through the federal civil service bureaucracy. This 
is the result of a recent law, signed in the final days of the presidency 
of Vladimir Putin, that provides an exception by presidential decree to 
the general rule prohibiting the appointment to the federal civil service of 
elected or politically appointed officials (Federal Law No. 30-FZ of March 
29, 2008, Art. 3). This change is in clear furtherance of the federal execu-
tive’s interpretation of Article 77(3) of the Constitution, as providing for 
his leadership of a “unified system of executive power” in the Russian 
Federation.
The civil service in Russia is divided into a federal civil service and 
the civil service bureaucracies of the component states (Federal Law No. 
58-FZ of May 27, 2003, Art. 2(2)). The legal regulation and organization of 
the federal civil service is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian 
 Federation (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 71(t)). This excludes personnel in 
the judicial and law enforcement organs of the state, which are within the 
joint jurisdiction of the central government and the component states (Con-
stitution RF, 1994, Art. 72(l)). The legal regulation of the civil service of each 





























320  KAHN ET AL.
the component state, while the organization of the component state civil 
service rests with that component state (Federal Law No. 58-FZ of May 27, 
2003, Art. 2(4)). We do not have adequate data to assess the current extent 
of lateral mobility between the federal civil service and the civil service 
bureaucracies of the component states. However, federal law seems to con-
template such mobility, e.g., in provisions for determining the total length 
of government service (Federal Law No. 58-FZ of May 27, 2003, Art. 14).
The Constitution grants the President the power to “use conciliatory 
procedures to resolve disputes between State government bodies of the 
Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of 
the Russian Federation, and disputes between State government bodies of 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation” (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 
85(1)). If the agreed resolution cannot be reached, the President can pass 
the dispute for consideration by the proper court.
The State Council is one such institution. Under the presidential 
decree “About the State Council of the Russian Federation,” one of the 
goals of the Council (which is composed of the heads of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation) is to provide assistance to the President in utiliz-
ing conciliatory procedures for resolution of the disagreements between 
public authorities of the Russian Federation and public authorities of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation, and also between the public authorities 
of the subjects of the Russian Federation (Ukaz Prezidenta RF No. 1602 of 
September 1, 2000).
Another unusual federal institution is the Envoy of the President of 
the Russian Federation in the Federal District. This institution was also 
established in May 2000 by decree of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion (Ukaz Prezidenta RF No. 849 of May 13, 2000). The decree and accom-
panying regulations divided Russia into seven federal districts. These dis-
tricts coincided with existing military districts. The capital of each district 
was deliberately chosen not to coincide with the capital of one of the non-
 Russian ethnic republics, in an effort to deflate the leadership pretensions 
of the most powerful component states. Each district is under the charge 
of one of the President’s “plenipotentiaries” (polnomochnyye predstaviteli, 
polpredy for short and commonly translated as “envoys”). According to 
the decree, these polpredy are officially part of the Administration of the 
President and are charged with overseeing the President’s constitutional 
authority in the districts. The polpredy report directly to the President.
Legal unification was among the primary objectives of the polpredy 
from the start. Polpredy were given extensive control over federal cadre 
policy in their districts and given wide access to participate in both federal 
government agencies operating in their districts and in the work of com-
ponent state institutions. Polpredy and large numbers of federal inspectors 
set to work scouring component state constitutions and laws as well as 
the bilateral treaties signed with the central government for conformity 
with federal legal norms. Among the functions of the Plenipotentiary of 
the President of the Russian Federation in the Federal District is organiza-
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the conciliation for resolution of the disagreements between federal public 
authorities and public authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federa-
tion, located within the limits of the federal district.”
INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND THE UNIFICATION 
OF LAW: LEGISLATURES
The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation is a bicameral legis-
lature comprising a lower chamber called the State Duma and an upper 
chamber called the Council of the Federation. The Duma contains 450 
deputies. The Council of the Federation comprises two representatives 
from each of the component states (thus, now composed of 166 senators). 
The autonomy of representation from the component states in the Federal 
Assembly has been substantially reduced in recent years. Between 1993 and 
2001, half of the deputies in the State Duma were selected  proportionally 
via nationwide party lists and half were selected by a first-past-the-post 
system of territorially defined electoral districts. Each component state’s 
two-person delegation to the Council of the  Federation comprised ex officio 
the head of the executive branch (the president, governor, or mayor) and 
the chairperson of the parliament of the component state (Federal Law 
No. 192-FZ of December 5, 1995).
Today, neither chamber of the Federal Assembly is as reflective of the 
component states or their governments. The Council of the Federation was 
restructured in 2000 at the start of Vladimir Putin’s first term as President 
(Federal Law No. 113-FZ of August 5, 2000). The top executive and legisla-
tive officials in each component state no longer serve ex officio in the upper 
chamber. This demotion cost them their senatorial immunity from prosecu-
tion and their direct influence over federal lawmaking. The chief executive 
of the component state now nominates senators, who must be approved 
by the regional legislature. Since the chief executive of each component is 
himself nominated by the President of the Russian Federation, there is rea-
son to suspect a reduction in the independence of these representatives.
Legislation passed in Putin’s second term changed the previous dou-
ble-ballot approach in the State Duma. All territorial electoral districts have 
been eliminated. The State Duma is now filled entirely through a propor-
tional system based on nationwide party lists (Federal Law No. 51-FZ of 
May 18, 2005). By removing clear connections between Duma deputies and 
territorially based constituencies, this restructuring has also diminished the 
representation of component state interests in the federal legislature.9
9Some have observed that, under President Putin, the federal legislature entered into the 
apparent habit of annually passing legislation (prepared by the Kozak Commission) that 
redistributed responsibilities and roles between the federal government and the component 
states in the guise of clarifying Article 72 of the Constitution (Leksin, 2007, pp. 132–153). If 
this discourse about diminishing federalism at least demonstrates that legislators continue 
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The division of taxing authority is made in the federal Tax Code. The 
central government collects a Value Added Tax, excise taxes, a tax on indi-
vidual income, a “Uniform Social” tax paid by employers from the wages 
of employees, a tax on mineral extraction, a water tax, and customs and 
duties (Federal Tax Code, Art. 13). The component governments collect 
taxes on business property, a tax on gambling businesses, and a tax on 
transportation (Art. 14). Municipal governments collect taxes on land and 
personal property (Art. 15).
Article 72(1)(i) provides that the central government and the compo-
nent states shall have joint authority over the “establishment of common 
principles of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation.” Both the cen-
tral government and the component states have taxing powers, although 
the extent of power exercised by the component states is largely within the 
control of the central government. Article 75(3) of the Constitution states 
that “The system of taxes paid to the federal budget and the general prin-
ciples of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation shall be determined 
by federal law.” Again, because of federal control over most taxation and 
natural resources, revenue sharing is largely a top-down affair.
INSTITUTIONAL POWER AND THE  
UNIFICATION OF LAW: COURTS
The Russian Supreme Court regularly addresses federalism ques-
tions.10 Under Article 27 of the Russian Civil Procedure Code, the Russian 
Supreme Court handles complaints alleging the illegality of presidential 
decrees and edicts of the Federal Cabinet. Governors or legislatures of 
component states may bring such complaints to the Supreme Court.11 The 
Court upholds the authority of the federal center in almost every case. 
The component states, after having lost their cases, often contest these 
judgments of the Russian Supreme Court in the Russian Constitutional 
10This sub-section draws substantially from Trochev (2008, pp. 139–155). That book, published 
by Cambridge University Press, is based on an extraordinary volume of primary sources 
and statistical data, including interviews with 15 justices and 15 clerks of the Constitutional 
Court. To aid the reader of this article (which is based on a report commissioned for the 
International Academy of Comparative Law), in-text citations, with additional bibliographic 
information in the References section, are provided for the major decisions that are referenced 
here. Readers are invited to study Trochev’s book for a more thorough statistical analysis of 
his data.
11In areas of joint jurisdiction, it remains unclear whether these decrees and edicts have a 
higher legal force than statutes of component states adopted on the same subject matter. The 
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Court by challenging the constitutionality of the federal legislation that 
the Supreme Court applied in their cases.12
Article 125 of the Constitution authorizes the Russian Constitutional 
Court to police whether central legislation has exceeded the lawmaking 
powers allocated to the central government. Governors or legislatures of 
the component states can request that the Court review the facial consti-
tutionality of federal statutes, decrees of the Russian President, and edicts 
of the Russian Cabinet (i.e., without requiring an underlying case filed in 
a trial court). Municipalities (and individuals) can request that the Court 
determine the constitutionality of federal statutes through a concrete judi-
cial review procedure (i.e., when the contested law “has been or is subject 
to being applied” to them). Component state legislatures can also ask the 
Court to issue a binding official interpretation of provisions of the Con-
stitution without challenging a specific federal statute. The Court issues 
such interpretations only in plenary meetings and by a two-third majority 
of votes of judges hearing the case (Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ 
of July 21, 1994, Art. 21; Trochev, 2008). Finally, the Court has the power to 
settle disputes between government bodies at the central and component 
state level over the scope of their authority. Government institutions can 
ask the Court to settle such disputes without challenging a specific federal 
statute.
Decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and binding on all gov-
ernment institutions at the federal, component state, and municipal levels. 
Increasingly, the Court issues a “constitution-conforming” interpretation 
of contested legislation without striking it down. Such an interpretation 
is also binding on all governments. Even when the Court declines to rule 
on the merits of a petition, the Court sometimes inserts a “constitution-
conforming” interpretation of contested legislation and insists that such 
interpretation is also binding (see, e.g., Opredeleniye KSRF No. 542-O, 
December 7, 2006). The Court accepts for review about 15–20 percent of 
petitions coming from the component states. Moreover, the Chief Justice 
or the Judge-Rapporteur routinely meets in person with the petitioners 
from the component state governments to discuss their cases. According 
to the official statistics published by the Court, between 1995 and 2006 
the Court received 627 petitions “on the issues of federalism” and issued 
over a hundred judgments accompanied by numerous dissents. Russia’s 
component states continued to use the Court more actively under Presi-
dent Putin’s centralizing regime (147 petitions) than under Yel’tsin’s presi-
dency (113 petitions).
12It should be noted that the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have a long and 
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General Federal Relations 
The Court has repeatedly allowed the component states to legislate 
in areas of joint jurisdiction “until the adoption of a federal statute on 
the matter.”13 This has gone hand in hand, however, with equally pow-
erful limitations on component state legislation once the federal center 
chooses to be more active. In 1996, the Court expanded federal supremacy 
in the joint federal-regional jurisdiction enumerated in Article 72 of the 
Russian Constitution (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 2-P of January 18, 1996). 
The Court has ruled that if the component states fail to legislate in the 
area of joint jurisdiction, then the federal center has the power to preempt 
responsibilities of the component state (Postanovleniye KSRF of No. 15-P 
of November 3, 1997). For example, the Court declared that the component 
states could not regulate advertising because only the federal legislature 
could set up the foundations of a single market—that is, free distribution 
of goods and fair competition (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 4-P of March 
4, 1997). These foundations, according to the Court, taken together with 
federal supremacy in fiscal policy, do not permit the expansion of compo-
nent state and municipal taxes and fees beyond those listed in federal law 
(Postanovleniye KSRF No. 5-P of March 21, 1997).14
Relations with Ethnic Republics
For much of the 1990s, the 21 ethnic republics within Russia demanded 
special privileges and status. The Court routinely repudiated these 
demands and upheld strong central government authority. In the 1995 
Chechnya Secession case, the Court approved and legitimized the authority 
of the Russian President to use military force to quell rebellion in the com-
13See, e.g., the Constitutional Court’s decisions (postanovleniya), Postanovleniye KSRF No. 
16-P (November 30, 1995) and Postanovleniye KSRF No. 12-P (July 9, 2002). For example, 
in 2001, the Constitutional Court upheld the right of component states to set up extra-
budgetary funds and to determine their own revenue bases, even though the Federal Budget 
Code did not assign this power to the component states and the Russian Supreme Court 
had earlier ruled that the creation of sub-federal extra-budgetary funds violated federal law 
(Opredeleniye KSRF No. 228-O, December 6, 2001). In another decision issued in 2002, the 
Constitutional Court refused to hear a petition by the federal Cabinet and reiterated that 
the delimitation of state property ownership between the federation and its parts should 
be achieved by balancing federal and sub-federal economic interests through the process of 
federal legislation (Opredeleniye KSRF No. 112-O of May 14, 2002).
14This court-ordered fiscal centralization ran against President Yel’tsin’s 1993 decree and 
against an earlier decision of the Court issued in 1996, both of which allowed the component 
states to set up their own taxes (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 9-P of April 4, 1996). Yel’tsin 
promptly repealed his decree and chose not to interfere with component state fiscal autonomy. 
The component states continued to levy their own taxes and set up various trade barriers, 
particularly in the wake of the August 1998 financial crisis. As a result, it was impossible by 
the end of the decade to ignore the diversity of fiscal regimes in Russia’s component states. 
Clearly, the widespread explosion of component state and municipal taxes, fees, and trade 
barriers (and even customs duties!) worried judges concerned about the future of Russia’s 
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ponent states and secession from the federation (Postanovleniye No. 10-P 
of July 31, 1995). It has upheld the central government’s prerogative to 
divide central and component state functions by adopting federal statutes 
instead of continuing the practice of signing bilateral intergovernmental 
treaties (Opredeleniye KSRF No. 13-O of February 4, 1997).15 It has struck 
down the “sovereignty” clauses of constitutions of seven republics (Post-
anovleniye KSRF No. 10-P of June 7, 2000; Opredeleniye KSRF No. 92-O 
of June 27, 2000). In the same decisions, the Court struck down numerous 
provisions on republican citizenship, and control over land use and natu-
ral resources. The Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of a federal statute that permits the federal executive, through a rather 
complicated and lengthy procedure involving courts of general jurisdic-
tion, to dissolve legislatures of the component states and to remove their 
governors (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 8-P of April 4, 2002).
Fiscal Federalism
The Court repeatedly rejected challenges to the power of the federal 
center to control component state fiscal policies. For example, the Court 
ruled that the constitutional requirements of a “social state” (Article 7) 
and a single-budget system limited the autonomy of the budgets of the 
component states and obliged them to provide federally-set guarantees of 
social protection—that is, the federal government could “commandeer” 
the component states to increase salaries and benefits for public employ-
ees (Opredeleniye KSRF No. 43-O of April 13, 2000). In another decision, 
the Court ruled that the states (and municipalities) cannot even pick and 
choose banks in which to keep their budgetary accounts—they have to 
keep them in the branches of the Russian Central Bank (Postanovleniye 
KSRF No. 12-P of June 17, 2004).
Appointments
The Court has concluded that the component states may not veto 
appointments of federal judges, procurators, and police chiefs in their 
 territories, as all such matters are the prerogative of the federal center 
(Postanovleniye KSRF No. 10-P of June 7, 2000). The Court ruled that only 
the federal legislature could regulate the involvement of the  component 
states in this process. The Court has also upheld legislation abolishing 
direct gubernatorial elections and granting the federal President the power 
to nominate and dismiss governors of the component states (overturning 
its own precedent set in 1996 that governors of the component states had 
15Articles 11(3) and 16(1) of the Constitution mention these agreements as part of the 
“foundations of constitutional order,” and by 1998 the central government had signed 
bilateral treaties with 47 component states (Kahn, 2002, p. 159). Nevertheless, the Court ruled 
that federal statutes were superior to intergovernmental agreements, and that the component 
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to be directly elected) (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 13-P of December 21, 
2005).
Recalling the weaknesses of Gorbachev’s presidency in handling the 
break-up of the USSR, most judges of the Constitutional Court agreed 
that the federal center had to be stronger to save Russia from politi-
cal,  economic, and territorial collapse even if it meant the widespread 
use of coercion, commandeering, and near-total federal preemption of 
the autonomy of component states. Numerous interviews with judges 
indicate that they perceived a strong (even authoritarian) federal cen-
ter to be the lesser evil compared to the breakdown in center–regional 
relations that characterized the recent past. The judgments of the Court 
issued between 1995 and 1998 largely paved the way for President 
Putin’s campaign of legal unification launched in 2000. Thus, the Court 
was effective in terms of shaping the recentralization of the Federation, 
but it was not effective in setting the limits of this centralization and 
legal unification.
The Russian Constitutional Court has the power to authoritatively 
interpret component state law. In its 2001 decision, the Court struck down 
the Moscow City land use law and declared that it is the court of last 
resort in any public law disputes in which all other courts failed to pro-
tect individual rights through the application of unconstitutional federal 
laws or laws of the component states. Thus, while the Russian Supreme 
Court and the Higher Arbitration Court have the statutory authority to 
interpret component state law, their interpretation can be challenged in 
the Constitutional Court. The case law of the Constitutional Court indi-
cates that this tribunal often interprets component state law through: (1) 
the complaints of individuals against the laws of component states, such 
as laws on land use, elections, and taxation; (2) the petitions of the gov-
ernments of the component states to confirm the constitutionality of their 
legislation, which had previously been invalidated by other federal courts 
as non-conforming with federal law, such as the structure of the civil ser-
vice; (3) the petitions of the governments of the component states to settle 
separation-of-powers disputes at the component-state level; and (4) the 
petitions of the members of the federal parliament to declare component 
state laws unconstitutional.
Throughout the 1990s, most component states successfully defied the 
unfavorable judgments of the Russian Constitutional Court that inter-
preted component-state law by openly or quietly refusing to implement 
them. However, by 2008, most component states reversed this stance and 
carried out constitutional court decisions interpreting component state 
law faster and in full. One area in which component states continue to 
defy the Court remains the regulation by component states of migra-
tion, as numerous component states continue to impose unconstitutional 
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North  Caucasus.16 But they are able to resist largely because the federal 
center has no interest in relaxing the control over the migration flows 
across Russia.
Although the Russian version of federalism diffuses some lawmaking 
power, judicial power is largely unified. Federal courts include: (1) the 
Russian Constitutional Court, (2) the Russian Supreme Court that crowns 
a hierarchy of almost 2,500 federal courts of general jurisdiction, of which 
there are 83 appellate courts and 2,400 trial courts, and (3) the Higher 
Arbitration Court that heads the hierarchy of arbitration courts, consisting 
of 10 cassation courts, 20 appellate courts, and 81 trial courts. The federal 
courts apply not only federal law but also the laws enacted by the compo-
nent states. Within the federal court system, the higher courts exercise the 
power to reverse judgments of lower courts for failure to correctly follow 
component state constitutions, charters, laws, and regulations.
The 1996 Federal Law “On the Judicial System of the Russian Federa-
tion” authorizes the component states to establish their own constitutional 
or charter courts as well as justices of the peace (JPs). The constitutional 
and charter courts will be discussed below. There are about 11,000 justices 
of the peace, and they exist on the level of political subdivisions of cities 
and regions. They are trial-level courts and form the lowest level of the 
courts of general jurisdiction. These courts have limited civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction over minor administrative offenses, 
similar to misdemeanors in common-law systems, including traffic vio-
lations. Decisions of the justice-of-the-peace courts can be appealed to 
the district-level federal courts of general jurisdiction, which conduct a 
complete de novo trial with live witnesses. Since 2000, the workload of the 
 justice-of-the-peace courts has grown dramatically, and in most compo-
nent states they became overloaded. In 2007, they handled all administra-
tive offenses, half of all criminal cases, and two-thirds of civil cases.
These courts, however, are not under the complete control of the com-
ponent states. The federal center determines the number of justices of the 
peace, their general qualifications, and their basic characteristics and juris-
diction. Their salaries are set by federal law and paid by the federal budget. 
The justices of the peace apply federal procedural law and substantive law, 
since federal law preempts the component state law in the areas of joint 
jurisdiction. The component state legislatures appoint JPs for renewable 
terms of five years but the chairs of federal courts de facto control judicial 
recruitment. The federal law requires component states to pay for the sup-
port staff of the JP courts and to provide logistical support to these courts.
16It should be noted, however, that the Constitutional Court recently complained that 
12 component states (Sakha-Yakutiya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkariya, 
Komi, Tyva, Chechnya, Buryatiya, Krasnodar, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, and Karachayevo-
Cherkessiya) still maintain constitutions or charters that assert sovereignty, ownership of 
natural resources, citizenship, and other provisions at odds with the Court’s caselaw (see 
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There are no formal mechanisms for resolving differences in legal 
interpretation among central and component state courts. While the Con-
stitution authorizes the Russian president to co-ordinate and reconcile 
relations among the top government institutions at both the federal and 
component state levels, no Russian president has greatly improved the 
thorny relations among the top three central Russian courts. A proposal 
to establish a “Higher Judicial Office” in charge of settling differences 
in judicial interpretation emerged during the 1993 constitution-making 
process and has resurfaced occasionally since the Constitution’s adop-
tion. But the judges of the Constitutional Court have repeatedly defeated 
these proposals, arguing that such an office is incompatible with judicial 
independence.
Differences are most often resolved via informal bargaining between 
judges of different courts. Sometimes, the Supreme Court and Higher 
Arbitration Court refer their differences in interpreting the same fed-
eral laws to the Constitutional Court through the abstract constitutional 
review procedure. Similarly, there are no formal mechanisms for resolv-
ing differences in legal interpretation among the Russian Constitutional 
Court and component state constitutional courts. Increasingly, the latter 
draw in their decisions on the legal interpretation offered by the former. 
When such differences arise, decisions of both courts containing conflict-
ing interpretations of component state law stand valid. There are no for-
mal mechanisms for resolving differences in legal interpretation among 
component state constitutional courts.
UNIFICATION OF LAW FROM THE TOP DOWN
If the unification of law in Russia now appears to be an empirically 
settled fact, how did it occur? Are the pressures entirely “top down,” or 
are there parallel pressures emanating from grass roots sources? To what 
extent do component states voluntarily coordinate their efforts to achieve 
a desired outcome? Have non-state actors played a role in this unifica-
tion? Does the process of legal education (a steady pressure from within 
the system) or international legal bodies (a steady pressure from without) 
exert a noticeable force in one direction or another? It is to these questions 
that we now turn.
The most direct source of unification has been the malleable language 
of the Russian Constitution itself. The Constitution establishes certain 
“fundamentals” in its first chapter (articles 1–16), and “rights and free-
doms of the individual and citizen” in its second chapter (articles 17–64). 
These chapters are protected from amendment; they may only be changed 
by drafting a new constitution (Art. 135). Among these fundamentals, 
as noted above, the Constitutional Court has invoked the sovereignty of 
the Federation to strike down component state legislation. Similarly, the 
equality of component states in their relations to the central government 
has been a means of unification and harmonization of law (Constitution 
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norms include the federal supremacy provisions of Article 15(1), and guar-
antees for a single economic space (Art. 8) and social welfare (Art. 7).
Similarly, individual rights norms influence unification efforts. The 
Constitution contains a highly detailed equal protection guarantee (Art. 
19(2)). The power of the state to limit individual rights is also limited both 
substantively and procedurally.17 Notably, component states are not per-
mitted to limit constitutionally protected individual rights for any reason, 
since such limitations are possible only by federal law (Art. 55(3)). Thus, 
the protection of individual rights—and choices about balancing indi-
vidual rights with state interests—are exclusively federal responsibilities. 
With each federal decision (executive, legislative, or judicial), therefore, 
Russian law in that area becomes more unified and more centralized.18
The number and specificity of rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
is such that resort to more general norms is not always necessary. The 
Constitution grants the central government the exclusive authority over 
the “regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms,” 
a reference to the 47 articles on the subject in chapter two of the Constitu-
tion (Constitution RF, 1994, Art 71 (“v”)).19 Thus, for example, although 
the Constitution provides generally for the independence of local self-
government as a protection against encroachment by other state authori-
ties, the more specific constitutional guarantee of voting rights has been 
held to permit the central government to enact framework legislation to 
harmonize the timing of municipal elections (Postanovleniye KSRF No. 
13-P of May 30, 1996).
The unification and harmonization of law is also accomplished through 
the judicial creation of uniform norms. Russia has three central supreme 
courts. The Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ for civil, criminal, 
administrative, and other cases in the federal judicial system. It also may 
determine the legality of the laws and regulations of component states. 
The Higher Arbitration Court hears commercial disputes and disputes 
between private businesses and governments. The Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction has already been described. Since the early 1990s, these courts 
have actively exercised their authority to strike down laws and regula-
tions of component states and municipalities that they determined to be 
17Some individual rights in this chapter may not be restricted for any reason (Constitution 
RF, 1994, Art. 56(3)). Other rights may be restricted, but only for specified reasons and only 
by federal law (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 55(3), Art. 45-46 (concerning defense of rights and 
judicial review)).
18Beyond constitutional provisions, central legislation, particularly the codes of law 
noted above, has played a very significant role in legal unification and harmonization. As 
already noted, most law in Russia is federal law. To the extent that the law of component 
states occupies a particular subject area, it is most likely to have been guided by federally 
promulgated principles.
19It should be noted that Article 72(b) assigns the “protection of human and civil rights and 
freedoms” to the joint authority of both the central government and component states. 





























330  KAHN ET AL.
in conflict with the Constitution and federal law. Since the Russian Con-
stitutional Court began functioning in 1992, this tribunal declared uncon-
stitutional more than a hundred component state legal acts.20 In 1998, the 
Court ordered other federal courts to strike down analogous component 
state legal acts, which were previously found unconstitutional (Opredele-
niye KSRF No. 147-O of November 5, 1998). By mid-1998, federal courts 
of general jurisdiction, headed by the Russian Supreme Court, declared 
illegal 2,016 sub-federal legal acts, issued by sub-federal legislatures and 
executives (S. S. Sukhova in Segodnya, February 16, 2000, p. 2). For much of 
the 1990s, however, the central government lacked the means to carry out 
judicial decisions and force the compliance of sub-federal governments 
with federal standards.
When Vladimir Putin announced a crackdown in 2000 against com-
ponent state laws that were not in line with federal standards, these courts 
largely approved his agenda and became major instruments of legal 
 unification. Between 2000 and 2001, federal courts reviewed over 4,000 
contested component state laws and regulations and struck down almost 
all of them (Ye. Grigor’yeva in Izvestiya, June 30, 2001). Moreover, amend-
ments made in 2001 to Article 87 of the federal constitutional law “On the 
Constitutional Court” provided that the judicial annulment of the provi-
sions of a law enacted by one of the component states automatically annuls 
all laws of all component states that contain the same provisions (Federal 
Constitutional Law No. 4-FKZ of December 15, 2001). By 2008, component 
states routinely accepted these court decisions, promptly repealed invali-
dated laws and regulations, or brought them into compliance with federal 
law. Most often, top federal courts were involved in unifying laws in the 
areas of joint jurisdiction. 
LEGAL UNIFICATION FROM THE BOTTOM UP?
Voluntary coordination by component state legislatures accounts for a 
rather small extent of legal unification in Russia. In other words, legal uni-
fication has not emerged from the “bottom up” in Russia. Restatements 
and uniform or model laws are unknown in Russia. Models for legislation 
typically come through the promulgation of federal guidelines regarding 
subjects within the joint authority of the central government and compo-
nent states. Nevertheless, component state legislatures do seem to learn 
from one another. This has been evident in the past in the similarities (to 
the point of identity) of their declarations of sovereignty adopted between 
June 1990 and July 1991. It is likewise evident in the formulaic approach 
to constitution-drafting that component states undertook in the early 
1990s. As discussed in more detail below, the 83 component states have 
been grouped into seven “federal districts,” each of which comprises six 
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to 18 component states. Their legislatures may find opportunities to inter-
act with each other through the office of the federal presidential envoy in 
charge of each district.
Russia has a unified judicial system in which federal courts over-
whelmingly predominate (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 118(3); Federal Con-
stitutional Law No. 1-FKZ of December 31, 1996, Art. 3). The Supreme 
Court and Higher Arbitration Court rest atop a pyramid of lower courts of 
general jurisdiction and lower arbitration courts, respectively. Two types 
of courts may be found in the component states: constitutional or charter 
courts, and justices of the peace. Justices of the peace function in all compo-
nent states except Chechnya. Constitutional or charter courts (depending 
upon the organic law of the component) function in only 16 component 
states: the republics of Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Chechnya, 
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkariya, Kareliya, Komi, Mari El, North Osetiya–
-Alaniya, Sakha-Yakutiya, Tatarstan, and Tuva; the oblasts (provinces) of 
Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk; and in the City of Saint Petersburg, which is 
one of two “cities of federal significance.”
The constitutional courts of component states are primarily concerned 
with determining whether the laws and decrees of component states and 
the municipalities within them comply with the constitutions (charters) of 
the component states through both abstract (advisory) and concrete (i.e., 
concerning particular cases) constitutional review procedures. By mid-
2008, these courts issued over 600 decisions.21 Eight courts began working 
before 1996. Their hasty creation was driven by component states seeking 
to create judicial systems that were independent of the central judiciary. 
During this period, these courts by and large did not strive for legal unifi-
cation. This decentralizing trend came to a halt at the end of 1996 with the 
passage of a federal constitutional law that entrenched a unitary judicial 
system (Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ of December 31, 1996).22 As 
a result of strengthening central power, the constitutional (charter) courts 
increasingly focused their attention on verifying the compliance with fed-
eral law of municipal and component state laws and regulations. In 2000, 
two-thirds of these court decisions concerned the compliance of such laws 
with federal laws (Trochev, 2004). The Russian Constitutional Court coor-
dinated and directed this trend in formal and informal meetings with the 
judges of these courts and was particularly solicitous of the requests of 
component state courts to consider the constitutionality of federal laws. A 
concerted effort to expeditiously publish decisions of these tribunals also 
contributed to unifying and harmonizing trends. In 1999 and 2001, the 
Court organized (together with the RF presidential administration) two 
large-scale meetings to promote the contribution of these courts to legal 
21This estimate is calculated from legal databases, court websites, and decisions published in 
regional mass media (see also Kryazhkov, 2007).
22Many governors challenged this law, but the Constitutional Court upheld its constitutionality 
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unification (Shubert, 2000; Mityukov et al., 2001). Such meetings allowed 
judges to discuss their jurisprudence and exchange views on judicial prac-
tice with colleagues in other jurisdictions.
This shift in transforming the courts of the component states into 
active agents of legal unification coincided with the enactment of numer-
ous federal statutes in areas of joint jurisdiction and pressure from the 
Putin administration to uphold their supremacy over the laws of compo-
nent states. The shift culminated in October 2002, when the St. Petersburg 
Charter Court rejected the attempt of the St. Petersburg governor to run 
for a third term (Postanovleniye Ustavnogo suda Sankt-Peterburga No. 
042-P of October 2, 2002).
Historically, agreements between the executive-branch officials of 
component states aimed to bolster the negotiating position of the compo-
nents against the federal center. Thus, they often promoted less unification 
and more legal conflict. Now, the chief executives of each component state 
are nominated by the federal president and confirmed by the regional leg-
islature. By presidential decree, they also may work as part of the fed-
eral civil service. (This is discussed in greater detail below). Therefore, as 
part of the “unified system of executive power” foreseen by Article 77 of 
the Constitution, legal unification may be increasingly advanced with the 
help of component state executive branches.
Turning now to private entities such as trade organizations and indus-
trial associations, generally these do not yet possess the necessary political 
influence to exert pressure for legal unification by exerting autonomous 
pressure on either the central government or the component states. When 
they do act, it is often in concert with state actors according to procedures 
established by federal law. The primary source of input into the legislative 
process by non-state actors is either through ad hoc involvement in the 
process of legislative initiative (which is legally possible in the compo-
nent states, although very rare) or through participation in parliamentary 
working groups and other committees of the State Duma (the lower cham-
ber of the Federal Assembly). Such participation is governed by federal 
law (Federal Law No. 82-FZ of May 19, 1995, Art. 27).
It is important to note that although freedom of association is con-
stitutionally guaranteed, non-governmental organizations are subject to 
substantial state regulation (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 30; Federal Law 
No. 82-FZ of May 19, 1995). Such associations take different forms but 
each type requires state registration and different levels of state intrusion 
into the activities of the association, with the consequences one would 
expect on the range of activities in which such organizations feel free to 
engage (Federal Law No. 82-FZ of May 19, 1995, Art. 7, 21 and Art. 23). 
Recent amendments to this law further tightened registration require-
ments (Federal Law No. 18-FZ of January 10, 2006). These sparked consid-
erable international controversy by increasing state control over non-gov-
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thus further limiting the independent growth of civil society.23 Such state 
involvement necessarily affects the capacity of non-state actors to orga-
nize, represent their members’ interests, and voice dissent.
Legislative Initiative
At the level of the central government, the right of legislative initiative 
is exclusively reserved to state actors (Constitution RF, 1994, Art. 104(1)). 
In component states, however, a more direct role for non-state actors is 
possible (Federal Law No. 184-FZ of October 6, 1999, Art. 6(1)). Five com-
ponent states appear to have granted the right of legislative initiative to 
non-governmental organizations (Zaks.ru, February 21, 2007, www.zaks.
ru/new/archive/view/27301). Twenty-four component states have legis-
lation extending the right of legislative initiative to Russian citizens resid-
ing in that component state (Afinogenov, 2008).
Parliamentary Working Groups
The general absence of a right of non-state actors to initiate legislation 
directly (although hardly unusual) has meant that non-state actors must 
either resort to their own lobbying efforts or seek ad hoc invitations to par-
ticipate in the legislative committees and working groups of the relevant 
legislature. Because of the top-down emphasis on legal unification in Rus-
sia, the most effective locus of this activity is in the lower chamber of the 
Federal Assembly, the State Duma. The State Duma establishes commit-
tees and commissions to draft and evaluate legislation (Constitution RF, 
1994, Art. 101(3); Reglament Gosudarstvennoy Dumy (hereafter “RGD”), 
Art. 19(2) and Art. 20). These are free to seek the involvement of both state 
and non-state actors for the “preparation of opinions, suggestions, and 
notes, and also to provide scholarly expertise” (RGD, Art. 112(1)). Duma 
regulations further provide for “working groups,” which are essentially 
subcommittees (RGD, Art. 111(3)). Consultative (i.e., non-voting) partici-
pation in such working groups may be extended quite broadly and may 
include representatives of non-state organizations and “experts and spe-
cialists” (RGD, Art. 111(4) and Art. 113(2)). The responsible committee has 
the right to conduct its own, independent, expert analysis of the confor-
mity of draft legislation with the Constitution and federal constitutional 
laws (RGD, Art. 112(1) and Art. 121(1)).24
23The US State Department repeatedly expressed its “serious concerns” about these 
amendments (see Press Statement No. 2006/66, US Department of State, January 19, 2006).
24Public discussion of drafts is also possible (RGD, Art. 119(6)). The Legal Office of the State 
Duma is specially tasked with determining the conformity of proposed legislation with all 
existing federal law (RGD, Art. 112(2) – (4)). The participation of this office is required when 
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Quasi-State Actors
Perhaps because of the highly regulated nature of civil society in the 
Russian Federation, an unusual feature is the role that quasi-state actors 
play in legal unification. These are organizations that are created by the 
state but are not part of the constitutional structure of the state. These 
organizations take different forms, the level of state influence in them var-
ies, and they occupy different roles. The following play a significant role 
in the law-making process:
(1) The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. The Public Cham-
ber was created in 2005 as a special body that “guarantees” the interaction 
of citizens of the Russian Federation with organs of state power at all lev-
els of government (Federal Law No. 32-FZ of April 4, 2005, Art. 1(1)). The 
Chamber consists of 126 members chosen in three tranches.25 Its organic 
statute establishes as its primary purpose the evaluation of draft legisla-
tion at both the central level and the component state level (Federal Law 
No. 32-FZ of April 4, 2005, Art. 2(3)). The Chamber possesses a variety of 
investigative and consultative powers, including a weak subpoena power 
for documents and materials necessary to evaluate proposed legislation 
(Arts. 16(3) and 18(4)). However, opinions of the Chamber are only advi-
sory in nature (Art. 17). In 2006–2007, the Public Chamber sent opinion 
letters to the State Duma regarding 65 draft pieces of federal legislation 
(Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008). Out of the 27 drafts that 
ultimately were passed into law by the end of 2007, 23 fully or partially 
took into account the Public Chamber’s opinion letters (Public Chamber 
of the Russian Federation, 2008). The Public Chamber has recently sought 
to make receipt of its opinion letters mandatory for all federal legislation, 
an idea which received initial support from (then President-elect) Dmitriy 
Medvedev (Rossiyskaya gazeta, March 20, 2008, p. 2).
(2) Russian Trilateral Commission for Social-Labor Relations. When 
draft legislation is proposed on labor issues, the Duma’s regulations 
require that the draft be submitted to the Russian Trilateral Commission 
for Social-Labor Relations (RGD, Arts. 108(13), 114(2)(“g”2), and 122(1)
(“z”)). The Commission is composed of representatives of the Russian 
Government, the All-Russia Organized Labor Association, and the All-
Russia Employers’ Association (Federal Law No. 92-FZ of May 1, 1999, 
Art. 1(1)). The latter two associations are non-state actors, although each 
association is formed on the basis of federal law (Federal Law No. 156-FZ 
of November 27, 2002; Federal Law No. 10-FZ of January 12, 1996).
25One-third of the membership (42 members) is chosen by the President of the Russian 
Federation. Nomination of civil servants is prohibited. Those members in turn select the next 
third (42 members) from competing all-Russian (i.e., nationally active) non-governmental 
organizations. The remaining third are chosen in a similar manner as representatives from 






























 UNIFICATION OF LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION    335
(3) The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federa-
tion. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation 
and similar chambers in the component states are established and operate 
under federal law (Federal Law No. 5340-1 of July 7, 1993). The Cham-
ber is a “non-state, non-commercial organization, uniting Russian busi-
nesses, and Russian entrepreneurs” (Art. 1(1)). Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry seek the creation of favorable conditions for entrepreneurial 
activity, for the regulation of entrepreneurs’ relations with their social part-
ners, and for the development of all kinds of entrepreneurial activity and 
promote connections with foreign entrepreneurs. The Chambers should 
not be mistaken for wholly non-governmental organizations: these goals 
are established by federal law (Art. 3(1)). State authorities are required by 
law to render assistance to chambers in achieving these goals; even assis-
tance as mundane as the provision of meeting places is established by law 
(Art. 4(1)). State authorities also exercise control and oversight over the 
Chambers’ observance of federal legislation (Art. 4(3)).26
The Chambers “conduct independent expertise of the drafts of statutory 
acts in the sphere of economics, external economic relations, and also on 
other issues, touching interests of businesses and entrepreneurs” (Art. 12(1)
(a)). Chambers participate in the evaluation of draft legislation, represent 
their interests in working groups and committees of the State Duma, and 
lobby for the introduction of draft legislation. Between 2004 and 2007, the 
federal Chamber evaluated 181 draft laws, and promoted 47 draft amend-
ments and 29 draft laws, including the Federal Law “About Development 
of Small and Medium Enterprises in the Russian Federation” of July 24, 
2007 (TPP RF, n.d.a). The Chamber also drafts a significant document called 
the “Conception of Legislation Development of Russian Federation,” which 
reflects its views of the most urgent business needs and legislative develop-
ments. The most recent (second) Conception concerns the period 2008–2011 
(TPP RF, n.d.b); the first Conception covered the period 2004–2007.
(4) The Ombudsman of the Russian Federation. The Ombudsman of 
the Russian Federation was created by statute in 1997 (Federal Constitu-
tional Law No. 1-FKZ of February 26, 1997). The Ombudsman considers 
Russian legislation about human rights. The Ombudsman has no right 
of legislative initiative. Therefore, the Ombudsman is limited to lobbying 
component states and the central government regarding proposed legis-
lation. In 2007, the Ombudsman made such references 62 times and pre-
pared four draft laws (Lukin, 2007). Forty-eight component states have 
their own ombudsmen.
Finally, one might ask what role legal education and training has 
played in the unification of law in Russia. In short, the influence has been 
a centralizing one because legal education is controlled by the federal 
 government. The main law schools in Russia draw students from through-
26State interference with Chambers’ activities is forbidden (Federal Law No. 5340-1 of July 
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out the federal system. The overwhelming focus of legal education (which 
follows the Western European model as an undergraduate course of study) 
is on central or system-wide law. The Government of the Russian Federa-
tion has the authority to establish procedures for drafting and confirming 
educational standards for higher professional education (Federal Law No. 
125-FZ of August 22, 1996, Art. 24(2)(8)). Accordingly, standards in the 
area of legal education in Russia are established by the central govern-
ment, in particular by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation 
(Ministerstvo obrazovaniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000). A state diploma 
as a “specialist in law” requires a five-year course of study. These national 
standards require 6062 hours of mandatory instruction in “general profes-
sional disciplines,” out of which 4,744 hours of instruction are required 
for the “federal component” and 658 hours are recommended for the 
“national-regional” component (Ministerstvo obrazovaniya Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, 2000).27 Therefore, law schools in Russia are mainly oriented to 
teach system-wide law.
Under federal law, the Chamber of Advocates of each component 
state determines the award of advocate status (admission to the bar) and 
administers the qualifying examination (Federal Law No. 63-FZ of May 
31, 2002, Art. 9(3)).28 It is the Federal Chamber of Advocates, however, that 
adopts the list from which questions on the exam may be drawn and estab-
lishes standards for the general procedure of bar admission (Art. 11(1)). 
The exam consists of both a written and an oral part (FPA, n.d.). The form 
of the written examination is determined by qualifications commissions of 
the Chamber of Advocates of the component state. The oral examination 
is administered with the use of examination cards, containing at least four 
questions from the list adopted by Federal Chamber of Advocates. The 
current list contains 588 questions (FPA, 2005). The overwhelming major-
ity are questions of federal law. The Chamber of Advocates of the compo-
nent state has substantial discretion to determine bar passage rates.
Federal Law does not contain any territorial restrictions applicable to 
one admitted to the bar (Federal Law No. 63-FZ of May 31, 2002). Thus, an 
advocate admitted to the bar of one of the component states can practice 
in all jurisdictions and in all levels of the court system. However, article 
15(4) of this law provides that an advocate may not be admitted to more 
than one bar at the same time. An advocate is free to move from member-
ship in the bar of one component state to that of another by filing a peti-
tion (Art. 15(5)).
27The federal component includes 24 subjects. The national-regional component is 
recommended to include four subjects: criminal-executive law (i.e., the law of enforcing 
court orders, including punishment), prosecutorial supervisory review (nadzor), the law of 
private enterprise, and commercial law. The remaining 660 hours are “electives” left to the 
choice of the student from a range established by the component state. In addition, 1,620 
hours are required in a “discipline of specialization” (a “major”).
28It should be noted that judicial candidates also take exams for elevation to the bench, just as 
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Graduates of the main law schools in Russia (Moscow State Legal 
Academy, Saint-Petersburg State University Law Department, Urals State 
Legal Academy, Saratov State Academy of Law, and others), especially 
those outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg, tend to practice and take jobs 
throughout Russia. For obvious reasons, graduates of law schools located 
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg tend to remain in those cities. Graduates 
of less prestigious law schools also tend to practice in the location of their 
schools.
Institutions of legal education and training also play a unifying role. 
One of most significant and successful of them is the Russian Academy 
of Justice, which was established in 1998 by the Russian Supreme Court 
and Russian Higher Arbitration Court. Establishment of the Academy 
was greeted by specialists on the Russian judiciary as a very positive step 
in the development of competent judges (Solomon and Foglesong, 2000). 
Its primary goal is the training of candidates for judicial office and other 
court officials, as well as their continuing education (Ukaz Prezidenta RF 
No. 528 of May 11, 1998). An important goal of the further training pro-
gram for judges, judicial candidates, and personnel of the courts of general 
jurisdiction is the promotion of a unified judicial system in the whole terri-
tory of the Russian Federation.29 It has 10 branches scattered over Russia.
Another prominent institution is the Russian Legal Academy under 
the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. This institution provides 
professional training, higher qualification training, and internships for per-
sonnel from all agencies of the Ministry of Justice, the Federal  Registrars 
Service, and the Federal Bailiffs Service (see the Academy’s website, 
www.minjust.ru/ru/sub_institution/low_academy/). It has branches in 
14 component states.
In addition to these two prominent institutions, the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs operates numerous legal institutions throughout Russia, which 
train personnel for that Ministry (see the list of training institutions in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, www.mvd.ru/about/education/100019/). 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office also has a similar set of institutions in its 
structure, training personnel for work in that federal office (see list of train-
ing institutions in the General Procuracy, http://genproc.gov.ru/structure 
/scientific/district-7/). The fact that these are subordinated within their 
corresponding agencies of the central government and provide training 
for personnel throughout Russia necessarily promotes a higher degree of 
uniformity in the performance of these law enforcement bodies.
LEGAL UNIFICATION FROM THE OUTSIDE IN
There is a certain irony in the fact that, whatever its effect has been 
on the promotion of individual rights and democratic governance in 
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 Russia, compliance with international legal obligations has had a central-
izing effect on Russian law. Article 15(4) of the Constitution provides that 
generally recognized principles of international law, as well as interna-
tional treaties of the Russian Federation, are a part of its legal system.30 
This clause continues: “If an international treaty of the Russian  Federation 
establishes rules, which differ from those stipulated by law, then the rules 
of the international treaty shall be applied.” This constitutional  provision 
makes international obligations an important source of the unification of 
law in Russia.
In most cases, Russia honors the treaty obligations that it has under-
taken, including those in the areas of legal unification and harmonization. 
Thus, the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods has 
direct effect in the civil law relations in Russia (Rozenberg, 1999). The 1971 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works had 
a direct influence on the drafting of the Fourth Part of the Russian Civil 
Code (Yakovlev and Makovskiy, 2007). It is worth noting that anticipation 
that Russia would join the World Trade Organization led to the drafting 
of particular provisions in the Fourth Part of the Russian Civil Code. That 
is, Russian domestic law took into account an international convention to 
which Russia was not a party, but hoped soon to be.
Participation in international organizations also plays a role. Russia’s 
entry into the Council of Europe substantially affected its legislation and 
led to the unification and harmonization of many laws. One of the con-
ditions of the admission of Russia into the Council of Europe required 
that Russia will “pursue legal reform with a view to bringing all legisla-
tion in line with Council of Europe principles and standards”  (European 
 Parliamentary Assembly, 1996a; European Parliamentary Assembly, 
1996b). The task of putting Russian law in accord with these standards 
required a considerable amount of unification or harmonization of law 
(Voinov, 2001; Nikitina, 2001; Ivliyev, 2004; Kahn, 2004, 2008; Trochev, 
2009). Sometimes this influence has had a positive effect in preserving 
local self-government. Russia’s ratification of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government, for example, has had a protective effect on the 
continued existence of local elections in Russia.
Russia is a party to or has signed five UNCITRAL (United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law) conventions and enacted only 
one statute based on an UNCITRAL model law. UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration was largely replicated in the Fed-
eral Law “About International Commercial Arbitration” (Spiegelberger, 
2005). Some specialists even argue that this Russian law, perhaps, as no 
other national law based on the Model Law, absorbed the provisions of 
30Article 7 of the First Part of the Civil Code restates the constitutional supremacy requirement 
and provides that international treaties act “directly” in the regulation of civil relations in 
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the Model Law with the minimum amount of additions and divergences 
(Kostin, 2002).
Russia is a member of UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Uni-
fication of Private Law). Russia has signed two UNIDROIT conventions 
and is a party to one convention (UNIDROIT, 2008, pp. 33–41).31 Russia 
is a contracting state to four international instruments that were adopted 
under the auspices of other organizations, but were based on UNIDROIT 
drafts or conventions. UNIDROIT has prepared only one model law: its 
Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002). Russia does not have rules of law 
regulating this subject. Russian courts make frequent references to the 
UNIDROIT Principle of International Commercial Contracts as, for exam-
ple, to its provisions on freedom of contract (article 1.1) (Resheniye arbi-
trazhnogo suda Krasnodarskogo kraya of May 4, 2007), interest for failure 
to pay money (article 7.4.9) (Resheniye arbitrazhnogo suda Belgorodskoy 
oblasti of May 23, 2007), and force majeure (article 7.1.7) (Resheniye arbitra-
zhnogo suda Kamchatskoy oblasti of November 23, 2007). Likewise, the 
International Commercial Arbitration Court under the Russian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry also applies UNIDROIT Principles in cases in 
which the parties have identified it as the applicable law, as well as on its 
own initiative as rules that reflect international trade customs  (Komarov, 
2007).
Russia has been a member of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law since 2001. Russia is a party to four of the conventions 
adopted by the Conference and has signed one.32 
Another organization, though not intergovernmental, which should 
be mentioned here is the International Chamber of Commerce and par-
ticularly its Incoterms (International Commercial Terms)—“standard 
trade definitions most commonly used in international sales contracts” 
(see the International Chamber of Commerce website, www.iccwbo.org/
incoterms/id3042/index.html). These terms were recognized by a decree 
of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry as trade custom on 
the territory of Russian Federation (Vilkova, 2004). The Chamber is not 
a public authority, so this decision is not legally binding. However, it 
31The Soviet Union signed the Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an 
International Will (1973) in 1974 and the Russian Federation is identified by UNIDROIT as 
the current signatory. Russia signed the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects (1995) in 1996. Russia became a party to the Convention on International Financial 
Leasing (1988) in 1998.
32The Soviet Union signed the Convention on Civil Procedure (1954) in 1966. The Russian 
Federation indicated in a diplomatic note of April 14, 1992 that it desired to be considered 
as a party to this Convention. The Soviet Union signed the Convention Abolishing the 
Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (1961) in 1991, and the Russian 
Federation indicated in a similar note in 1992 its intention to be considered a party. The 
Russian Federation became a party to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (1965) in 2001. The Russian 
Federation acceded to the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
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 indicates the recognition of its importance in the light of certain Civil Code 
provisions about customs of business intercourse as one of the means of 
privity regulation.
CONCLUSION
We believe that Russia is a highly centralized federal state with an 
extremely unified legal system. We also believe that plausible arguments 
can now be made—based on its new electoral system, “unified system 
of executive authority,” and current division of jurisdiction between the 
central and component state governments—that Russia may have ceased 
to be a federal state in any meaningful sense of the term. Terms lose their 
meaning when stretched too far.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Russia remains federal because its 
legal processes (and political will) preserve the federal character of the 
state. Its current degree of centralization of power and unification of law 
was not inevitable and may not be permanent. The history of this very 
new federal state is one of substantial change in the relationship between 
the central government and the component states. It is worth noting that 
in the face of so much change, the federal Constitution remained virtually 
unchanged until the final days of 2008.33 We do not think that this is evi-
dence of the Constitution’s irrelevance. To the contrary, we think that this 
indicates a degree of flexibility built into the Constitution (although we 
do not speculate whether this flexibility was intentional) that has given it 
what Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once described as the necessary “play in 
its joints” that has led to its changing interpretation in changing times and 
circumstances (Holmes, 1931).34 However, it should be noted that the most 
recent amendment (which lengthens the terms in office for the President 
and members of the State Duma) is part of a trend of increasing power 
to the federal center, particularly the Executive Branch (Federal Constitu-
tional Law No. 6-FKZ of December 30, 2008).35 The day may come when 
the current trends of unification of law and centralization of authority are 
33Until December 30, 2008, only those passages concerning the number and identity of 
component states had been changed (always according to constitutionally established 
processes).
34The full quotation is: “The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. 
We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed 
a little play in its joints.”
35The law increases the term in office of the president to six years (from four) and of members 
of parliament to five years (from four). The amendment was accomplished with unusual haste 
following its proposal by President Medvedev in his address to the Federal Assembly on 
November 5, 2008. According to one respected national newspaper, the upper chamber of the 
parliament, the Council of the Federation, required only 20 minutes to pass on the measure, 
which had already been approved by more than the two-thirds of regional legislatures 
required by Article 136 of the Constitution (A. Barakhova in Kommersant, December 23, 
2008). On the eve of adoption, one liberal party (Yabloko) protested this haste as a violation 
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reversed, perhaps with little need for constitutional amendment to accom-
plish this altered course. For the present, however, we see problems from 
too much unification of law, rather than not enough.
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